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Abstract
In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if
players are sufficiently patient, and long-term gains from cooperation
outweigh short-term gains from deviation. What happens if the play-
ers have incomplete information regarding each other’s discount fac-
tors? In this paper we look at repeated games in which each player has
incomplete information regarding the other player’s discount factor,
and ask when full cooperation can arise in equilibrium. We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions that allow full cooperation in equi-
librium that is composed of grim trigger strategies, and characterize
the states of the world in which full cooperation occurs. We then ask
whether these “cooperation events” are close to those in the complete
information case, when the information on the other player’s discount
factor is “almost” complete.
1 Introduction
Cooperation is an important theme in human behavior. In repeated interac-
tions, cooperation is often achieved by threats: if a player deviates from an
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agreed upon plan, the other players will punish him. The effectiveness of the
threat is determined by the loss that the deviator incurs if the punishment
is executed: if the loss is high, the threat is effective.
Controlling behavior by threats is possible only if the players assign high
enough weight to future payoffs, that is, if they are sufficiently patient, and
future payoffs sufficiently affect their overall utility. This implies that some-
times cooperation cannot arise in equilibrium: if a player is supposed to
cooperate but is not patient, he will prefer to deviate and obtain short-term
profits. The same will happen if a player believes that some other player
is not patient; in this case, the player will believe that that player will not
cooperate, and therefore he will have no reason to cooperate as well.
In the present paper we study a model in which each of two players does
not know how patient the other player is; that is, the players have incomplete
information regarding each other’s discount factor. We ask whether and when
full cooperation can arise in equilibrium, or, more exactly, what should be
the players’ beliefs so that cooperation arises in equilibrium. To develop our
ideas we consider the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Figure 1), which is
a classical game that is used to study issues relating to cooperation.
Cooperate
Defect
Defect Cooperate
0, 4
1, 1
3, 3
4, 0
Figure 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this game, both players have two actions, Cooperate (C) and Defect
(D). The action D strongly dominates the action C in the one-shot game. If
the players wish to cooperate, they may want to play (C,C) at every stage,
thereby obtaining the payoff (3, 3) at every stage. By deviating toD, a player
profits 1 at the stage of deviation. This deviation will not be profitable if the
total loss that the player will incur due to this deviation is higher than 1.
There are many ways in which a player can punish the other player for de-
viating. One way uses the grim trigger strategy: if the other player deviates
at stage t and plays D instead of C, punish him by playing D in all future
stages. If a player employs the grim trigger strategy, then the deviator loses
at least 2 in every stage following a deviation. In particular, as soon as the
discount factor of the deviator is at least 1
3
, the deviation is not profitable.
Another way to punish a deviator is by using the tit-for-tat strategy, in which
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at every stage the player plays the action that the other player played in the
previous stage. It turns out that this punishment deters deviations as soon
as the discount factor of the deviator is at least 1
3
as well.
These constructions yield equilibrium when the players’ discount factors
are common knowledge. In this case, each player knows how much the other
player stands to lose for deviating, and therefore he knows whether the other
player will be willing to cooperate. In the present paper we study two-player
repeated games in which the players have incomplete information regarding
each other’s discount factor. Our goal is to study when full cooperation may
arise in equilibrium; that is, what are the beliefs of the players that allow
play paths in which the players cooperate all through the game.
To illustrate the complexity of the analysis of this problem, suppose that
the discount factors of the players are not common knowledge. A naive
strategy profile is one in which at the first stage each player signals whether or
not he is willing to cooperate, and in subsequent stages the players cooperate
only if both expressed willingness to cooperate at the first stage. Signalling
at the first stage is achieved by playing C if one’s discount factor is at least
1
3
, and playing D otherwise. This profile may not be an equilibrium, because
if a player’s discount factor is above 1
3
, but he assigns high probability to the
event that his opponent’s discount factor is lower than 1
3
, then the player has
incentive to deviate and play D at the first stage.
As mentioned before, it is easier to support cooperation when the punish-
ment is severe. Our goal is to focus on the conditions on the beliefs of a player
that are needed for cooperation in equilibrium. We will therefore consider
the most severe punishment, which is achieved by the grim trigger strategy;
that is, if a player deviates, he is punished in all subsequent stages. We thus
allow each player to be of one of two types: a non-cooperative type who
always defects, and a cooperative type who follows the grim trigger strategy.
As we show through an example (see Example 5.4), the grim trigger strategy
is not necessarily the strategy that yields the most widespread cooperation,
that is, cooperation in the largest set of states of the world. We choose to
focus on the grim trigger strategy because, due to its simplicity, it allows us
to focus on the players’ beliefs, even under complex information structures.
Under the grim trigger strategy profile, if the player’s discount factor is
below 1
3
, then he will not cooperate, and will be of the non-cooperative type.
The player will also be of the non-cooperative type if he assigns sufficiently
high probability to the event that his opponent is of the non-cooperative
type. He will also refuse to cooperate if he assigns high probability to the
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event that the opponent assigns high probability to him being of the non-
cooperative type, etc. Thus, cooperation can arise only when both players’
discount factor is at least 1
3
, each player assigns sufficiently high probability
to the event that the other player’s discount factor is at least 1
3
, each player
assigns sufficiently high probability to the event that the other player assigns
sufficiently high probability to the event that his (the player’s) discount factor
is at least 1
3
, etc. In other words, an infinite list of requirements must hold
so that full cooperation will arise.
Not surprisingly, the infinite list of requirements necessary to support an
equilibrium can be summarized by two conditions. So that full cooperation
arises in equilibrium one should require that (a) each player’s discount factor
is at least 1
3
, and (b) each player assigns a sufficiently high probability that the
other player is going to cooperate. For the conditions to be sufficient, we need
to add a third condition, (c) that whenever a player does not cooperate, he
assigns a sufficiently high probability to the event that the other player is not
going to cooperate. Interestingly, the probability in (b) is not constant, but
depends on the player’s discount factor: the higher his discount factor, the
more the player will lose if cooperation is not achieved. Therefore, a player
with high discount factor will cooperate in situations where he wouldn’t have
cooperated if his discount factor were lower.
To model incomplete information on the discount factor we use a Harsaniy’s
game with incomplete information, where the state of nature is the pair of the
players’ discount factors, and the concept of Bayesian equilibrium.1 A pair
of events (K1, K2) is a pair of cooperation events if the strategy pair in which
each player i plays the grim trigger strategy on Ki and always defects on
the complement of Ki is a Bayesian equilibrium. That is, when cooperation
events occur, full cooperation is possible in equilibrium.
We start by providing a complete characterization of pairs of cooperation
events. We then define a new concept of f -belief, which is a generalization
of Monderer and Samet’s (1989) concept of p-belief: when f is a real-valued
function defined over the set of states of the world, an event A is an f -belief of
player i at the state of the world ω if the conditional probability that player
i assigns to A at ω is at least f(ω). This concept is closely related to the
cooperation condition (b) mentioned above, since in order to cooperate each
player needs to assign a sufficiently high probability that the other player is
1The results would not change if we used perfect Bayesian equilibria instead of Bayesian
equilibria.
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going to cooperate, a probability that depends on his own discount factor,
and therefore on the state of the world; that is, the player has to f -believe
that the other player is going to cooperate, for a certain function f . Using
the notions of iterated f -belief and common f -belief we provide an iterative
construction of the largest pair of cooperation events.
The characterization of cooperation events can be generalized for other
two-player games. For 2×2 games the results remain fairly the same, with an
appropriate adjustments of conditions (a)–(c). In the case of larger games,
while (the equivalent of) conditions (a)–(c) still characterize cooperation
events, our construction of the largest pair of cooperation events is no longer
valid.
Another solution concept that was studied in the literature is that of
interim correlated rationalizabiliy (ICR), see, e.g., Dekel, Fudenberg, and
Morris (2007) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). With respect to this concept
the results have the same flavor, yet condition (c) is not necessary for a
grim trigger strategy to be rationalizable. In this case the construction of
cooperation events via f -beliefs is simpler and can be easily extended to
games larger than 2× 2.
A natural question is whether, when there is almost complete information
on the discount factors, there are cooperation events that are close to the
cooperation events in the case of complete information. Monderer and Samet
(1989) ensure that there is an equilibrium that coincide with the complete
information equilibrium in most states of the world, when the information is
almost complete in a certain sense. However, in their setting there are always
“unmapped areas” in this almost complete information equilibrium; that is,
states of the world in which the strategy is not specified. We ask whether,
in an almost complete information setting, there is an equilibrium in grim
trigger strategies that is defined in every state of the world and is close to the
complete information equilibrium. It turns out that the answer depends on
the definition of almost complete information. We will provide two natural
definitions for this concept; in one, similar to Mondrer and Samet (1989),
the answer is positive for the prisoner’s dilemma and a certain class of other
games, but generally it is negative, while in the other it is positive for all
games.
Our analysis demonstrates the significance of the concept of f -belief to
the study of cooperation in the presence of incomplete information. Plainly
the decision whether or not to cooperate depends on the whole hierarchy
of belief of the player; our analysis reveals that it crucially depends on the
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exact discount factor of the player, and not only, say, on whether it is above
or below some fixed threshold, as is the case in the games with complete
information. Finally, our analysis shows that the details of the definition of
almost complete information drastically affect the continuity of the largest
pair of cooperation events as a function of the beliefs of the players, and
we point out at one possible definition of the concept that guarantees the
continuity of this function.
The literature regarding repeated games with different discount factors,
and specifically with incomplete information regarding them, is quite scant.
The most thorough analysis of repeated games with different discount factors
with complete information that we are aware of is Lehrer and Pauzner (1999)
who characterize the equilibrium payoffs in two-player games and show that
the set of feasible payoffs in the repeated game is typically larger than the
convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs. Lehrer and Yariv (1999)
analyze the case of two-player zero-sum repeated game with one-sided incom-
plete information regarding the payoff matrix in which the discount factors
are common knowledge. The analysis closest to ours is Blonsky and Probst
(2008), who deal with a two-player game with incomplete information regard-
ing the discount factors. Their paper characterizes the efficient equilibria and
the Pareto frontier of the payoffs in a game that is related to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, but with more strategies in the stage game, which correspond to
different levels of cooperation or trust. Our paper differs from Blonsky and
Probst (2008) in several aspects. First, we deals with a different class of
games that do not include a mechanism of gradually building trust embed-
ded. Second, while Blonsky and Probst (2008) takes a simple information
structure and ask what are the effective equilibria, we take a simple and nat-
ural strategy (grim trigger) and check checks when it induces an equilibrium
for a given information structure. In other words, while Blonsky and Probst
(2008) show how an equilibrium with cooperation look like in a specific game
and information structure, we study the requirements on the players’ beliefs
that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in grim trigger strategies.
Other papers that deal with cooperation in repeated games with incom-
plete information, albeit in settings quite different from ours, are Watson
(1999,2002), who analyze the building of trust in a two-player game with
incomplete information regarding the payoff matrix, somewhat similar to the
game in Blonsky and Probst (2008), and Kajii and Morris (1997) and Chas-
sang and Takahashi (2011), who investigate the robustness of equilibria in
repeated games to a small amount of incomplete information on the payoff
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matrix. Chassang and Takahashi (2011) also deal specifically with the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma and show that the grim trigger equilibria are not the most
robust way to sustain cooperation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with incomplete information on the discount factor, and
the concept of cooperation events. In Section 3 we characterize pairs of co-
operation events. In Section 4 we present the concepts of f -belief, common
f -belief and iterated f -belief, and characterize the largest pair of cooperation
events in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma using these notions. Examples
are provided in Section 5. In Section 6 we present several extensions and
additional results, including general two-player games with incomplete infor-
mation on the other player’s discount factor, the analysis of almost complete
information, and another possible application of the concept of f -belief, to
define sufficient conditions for “combining” two different complete informa-
tion equilibria into an incomplete information equilibrium, not necessarily in
a repeated game.
2 The Model
Consider the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with incomplete information on
the discount factors. That is, the set of states of nature is S = [0, 1)2; a state
of nature s = (λ1, λ2) ∈ S indicates the discount factors λ1 and λ2 of the two
players 1 and 2 respectively. An arbitrary player will be denoted by i; when
i is a player, j denotes the other player.
We consider a general (that is, not necessarily finite) set of states of the
world Ω, equipped with a σ-algebra Σ. The function λ = (λ1, λ2) : Ω → S
indicates the state of nature that corresponds to each state of the world;
thus, λi(ω) ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor of player i at the state of the world
ω.
The belief of each player i is given by a function Pi : Ω → ∆(Ω). We
denote by Pi(E | ω) the probability that player i ascribes to the event E ∈ Σ
at the state of the world ω, and by Ei(· | ω) the corresponding expectation
operator. The function Pi is measurable in the sense that, for every E ∈ Σ,
the function ω 7→ Pi(E | ω) is measurable. This function is required to be
consistent, in the sense that each player knows his belief: Pi({ω
′ : Pi(ω) =
Pi(ω
′)} | ω) = 1, for every ω ∈ Ω. We assume throughout2 that each player i
2Similar though slightly weaker results to the ones we obtain below can be proven
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knows his own discount factor in every state of the world ω: Pi({ω
′ : λi(ω
′) =
λi(ω)} | ω) = 1 for every ω ∈ Ω. The triplet (Ω,Σ, (P1, P2)) is called a belief
space.
The type of player i at the state of the world ω is the set of all states of
the world that are indistinguishable from the true state of the world, given
the player’s information; formally, it is the set {ω′ | Pi(ω
′) = Pi(ω)}.
To allow general information structures, we assume that the information
that a player has is described by a sub-σ-algebra Σi of Σ, and that both λi
and Pi are Σi-measurable. Thus, each player knows his discount factor and
his beliefs. The σ-algebra Σi identifies the events that can be described by
player i.
The game is played as follows: at the outset of the game, a state of the
world ω ∈ Ω is realized, each player i learns his type, and therefore also
his discount factor λi(ω). Then the players repeatedly play the Prisoner’s
Dilemma that appears in Figure 1 (see page 2).
A course of action of player i is a function that assigns a mixed action of
player i to each finite history of actions in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
This is a strategy for the player given his type.
Two simple courses of action of player i are the always defect course of
action D∗i , in which he always plays D, and the grim trigger course of action
GT ∗i , in which he cooperates at the first stage, and in every subsequent stage
he cooperates only if the other player cooperated in all previous stages.
A strategy of player i is a Σi-measurable
3 function ηi that assigns a course
of action ηi(ω) to each state of the world ω.
The subjective payoff of player i under the strategy profile (ηi, ηj), condi-
tional on the state of the world ω, is γi(ηi, ηj | ω) = Ei(
∑∞
t=1(λi(ω))
t−1ui,t |
ω), where ui,t is player i’s payoff at stage t. Note that the subjective payoff
depends on ω in three ways: first, player i’s discount factor depends on ω;
second, the course of action that player i takes depends on ω; and third, the
belief of player i about player j’s type, and therefore about player j’s course
when the players have incomplete information regarding their own discount factor as well
as the other player’s discount factor. However, the assumption that a player knows his
own discount factor is natural in many applications, and it allows us to concentrate on
the impact of incomplete information on the other player’s discount factor.
3So that Σi-measurability of strategies is well defined, one needs to introduce a topolog-
ical structure on the space of courses of actions. In this paper we will study only a simple
type of strategies, conditional grim trigger strategies, which is defined below (Definition
2.1), and the measurability issue will not arise.
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of action, also depends on ω.
In the complete information case both players know each other’s discount
factor. In this case, the grim trigger course of action is an equilibrium if and
only if the discount factors of both players are at least λ0i :=
1
3
. Thus, the
players will cooperate in some states of the world, and will never cooperate in
the remaining states of the world. This observation leads us to the following
definition of a conditional grim trigger strategy, in which the player plays a
grim trigger course of action in some states of the world, and always defects
in the rest of the states of the world.
Definition 2.1 Let i ∈ {1, 2} be a player, and letKi ⊆ Ω be a Σi-measurable
set. The conditional grim trigger strategy with cooperation region Ki for
player i, denoted by η∗i (Ki), is the strategy defined by
η∗i (Ki, ω) =
{
GT ∗i if ω ∈ Ki,
D∗i if ω /∈ Ki.
If a player plays a conditional grim trigger strategy, his action at the
first stage reveals whether he follows the grim trigger course of action or the
“never cooperate” course of action.
If η∗(K1, K2) := (η
∗
1(K1), η
∗
2(K2)) is a Bayesian equilibrium, then when-
ever ω ∈ K1 ∩K2 the players will cooperate all along the game.
Definition 2.2 The pair of events (K1, K2) is called a pair of cooperation
events if η∗(K1, K2) = (η
∗
1(K1), η
∗
2(K2)) is a Bayesian equilibrium,
As mentioned in the introduction, the significance of cooperation events
is that they enable cooperation all through the game, without the need to
exchange information. As Example 5.4 below shows, there are equilibria
in which the players cooperate from some stage on, after a short signalling
period, even when there are no non-trivial cooperation events.
The pair (∅, ∅) is a pair of cooperation events in which the players never
cooperate. Moreover, if (K1, K2) are cooperation events and Ki = ∅, then
Kj = ∅. Indeed, if Ki = ∅ then player i never cooperates, so that player j’s
dominant strategy is never to cooperate.
Note that there may be two pairs of non-empty yet disjoint cooperation
events. Indeed, given a belief space with a pair of non-empty cooperation
events (K1, K2), consider an auxiliary belief space that includes two indepen-
dent copies of the original belief space. Then the two copies of (K1, K2) are
two pairs of disjoint cooperation events in the auxiliary belief space.
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The larger the sets (K1, K2), the higher the probability that cooperation
will occur. If there are several pairs of sets (K1, K2) for which η
∗(K1, K2) is a
Bayesian equilibrium, then using pre-play communication or a mediator the
players can agree on the Bayesian equilibrium with largest pair of cooperation
events (K1, K2). Our main goal is to characterize the cooperation events, and
to provide an algorithm for calculating the largest pair of cooperation events
(K1, K2).
3 Characterization of the Cooperation Events
We start by characterizing cooperation events in the (simple) benchmark case
of complete information, where the discount factors are common knowledge
among the players. We will then analyze the general case with incomplete
information.
When the game has complete information, in equilibrium each player
knows the course of action that the other player will take: a player coop-
erates if and only if his discount factor is at least λ0i =
1
3
and the other
player cooperates. In particular, if η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium then
necessarily K1 = K2: We therefore obtain the following characterization for
cooperation events in the complete information case.
Theorem 3.1 When the game has complete information, (K1, K2) is a pair
of cooperation events if and only if K1 = K2 ⊆ Λ, where Λ := Λ1 ∩ Λ2 and
Λi := {ω ∈ Ω: λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i } for i ∈ {1, 2}.
When information is incomplete the characterization of cooperation events
is more subtle, and is described by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Let Ki ⊆ Ω be a Σi-measurable event for each i = 1, 2. The
pair (K1, K2) is a pair of cooperation events if and only if, for each i = 1, 2
(a) Ki ⊆ Λi;
(b) Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki; and
(c) Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ fi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki;
where fi is the Σi-measurable function defined by fi(ω) :=
1−λi(ω)
2λi(ω)
.
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Condition (a) is an individual rationality condition: a player will not
cooperate if his own discount factor is not sufficiently high to justify coop-
eration. Conditions (b) and (c) capture the whole hierarchy of beliefs that
should hold to ensure cooperation. Condition (b) requires that whenever a
player is supposed to cooperate, he assigns sufficiently high probability that
the other player will cooperate; if this were not the case, the player would
find it beneficial not to cooperate at that state of the world. The cutoff for
cooperation depends on the player’s discount factor, and therefore it depends
on the state of the world. Indeed, if the player’s discount factor is high, he
will be willing to take the risk and cooperate in the first stage even if the
probability of the event that the other player will also cooperate is low, be-
cause the possible loss in the first stage is small due to the high discount
factor. Condition (c) is analogous to condition (b); it requires that whenever
a player is not supposed to cooperate, he assigns low probability to the event
that the other player will cooperate; otherwise, the player would prefer to
cooperate. Note that condition (c) trivially holds for ω /∈ Λi because in this
case fi(ω) ≥ 1.
The proof of the theorem appears in Appendix A.
It is interesting to note that Theorem 3.1 is a special case of Theorem
3.2. When information is complete, whether or not the state of the world
ω lies in K1 or K2 is common knowledge among the players, and therefore
Pi(Kj | ω) is either 0 or 1. If K1 = K2 then the probability in condition
(b) is 1 and the probability in condition (c) is 0. Since Ki ⊆ Λi, we have
fi(ω) ≤ 1 for ω ∈ Ki. Moreover, fi > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω. It follows that
in this case conditions (b) and (c) hold. On the other hand, if K1 6= K2
and ω ∈ Ki \ Kj, then Pi(Kj | ω) = 0, and condition (b) does not hold.
Therefore, as Theorem 3.1 states, we deduce that the conditions that ensure
that (K1, K2) are cooperation events are K1 = K2 ⊆ Λ1 ∩ Λ2.
4 Belief Operators
In this section we present the concepts of f -belief and common f -belief,
which are generalizations of the concepts of p-belief and common-p-belief
introduced by Monderer and Samet (1989). These concepts will be useful in
the construction of cooperation events.
The definitions and results presented in this section are valid for gen-
eral belief spaces with any finite number of players (see Definition 10.1 in
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Maschler, Solan, and Zamir (2013) for a formal definition of a general belief
space).
Definition 4.1 Let i be a player, and let fi : Ω → R be a Σi-measurable
function, let A ⊆ Ω be an event, and let ω ∈ A. Player i fi-believes in the
event A at the state of the world ω if Pi(A | ω) ≥ fi(ω).
We say that both players f -believe in an event at the state of the world ω
if player 1 f1-believes in the event at ω and player 2 f2-believes in the event
at ω. A function f : Ω→ R2 is called *-measurable if fi is Σi-measurable for
each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Definition 4.2 Let f : Ω → R2 be a *-measurable function, let A ⊆ Ω be
an event, and let ω ∈ A. The event A is common f -belief at the state of
the world ω if at ω each player i fi-believes in A, each player i fi-believes
that both players f -believe in A, each player i fi-believes that both players
f -believe that both players f -believe in A, etc. ad infinitum.
If there is p ∈ (0, 1) such that f1 ≡ p and f2 ≡ p, then f -belief and com-
mon f -belief reduce to Monderer and Samet’s (1989) p-belief and common
p-belief, respectively. If fi is a constant function pi for each i ∈ {1, 2}, but
p1 and p2 may differ, then the concept of f -belief reduces to the concept of
p-belief of Morris and Kajii (1997), where p = (p1, p2).
An equivalent formulation of conditions (b) and (c) of Theorem 3.2 using
the concept of fi-belief, where (fi)i=1,2 are the functions that are defined in
the statement of the theorem, is the following:
(b’) Kj is an fi-belief in Ki; and
(c’) Kcj is a (1− fi)-belief in K
c
i .
Thus, the events (K1, K2) are cooperation events if (a) each Ki is a subset
of Λi (individual rationality condition), (b’) at each state of the world in
which player i is supposed to cooperate, he fi-believes that the other player
is going to cooperate, and (c’) at each state of the world in which player i is
not supposed to cooperate, he (1 − fi)-believes that the other player is not
going to cooperate.
Definition 4.3 Let i be a player, and let fi : Ω → R be a Σi-measurable
function. The fi-belief operator of player i is the operator B
fi
i : Σ→ Σ that
assigns to each event the states of the world at which player i fi-believes in
the event: Bfii (A) := {ω ∈ Ω | Pi(A | ω) ≥ fi(ω)}.
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Because both fi and Pi are Σi-measurable functions, the set B
fi
i (A) is in
Σi for every event A.
Let f : Ω→ R2 be a *-measurable function. Using the fi-belief operator
we can formally define common f -belief. Define
D0,f(C) := C, (1)
Dn+1,f(C) := Bf11 (D
n,f(C)) ∩ Bf22 (D
n,f(C)) for every n ≥ 0, (2)
Df(C) :=
⋂
n≥1
Dn(C). (3)
An event C is common f -belief at ω if and only if ω ∈ Df(C).
The following proposition, which lists several desirable properties that
the f -belief operator satisfies, is analogous to results derived in Monderer
and Samet (1989).
Proposition 4.4 Let i ∈ {1, 2} and f : Ω → R2 be *-measurable. The
following statements hold:
1. If A,C ∈ Σ and A ⊆ C, then Bfii (A) ⊆ B
fi
i (C).
2. If A ∈ Σ then Bfii (B
fi
i (A)) = B
fi
i (A).
3. If (An)
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence of events, then B
fi
i (
⋂∞
n=1An) =⋂∞
n=1B
fi
i (An).
4. If C ∈ Σ is a Σi-measurable event, then
Bfii (C) = (C \ {ω ∈ Ω | fi(ω) > 1}) ∪ {ω ∈ Ω | fi(ω) ≤ 0}.
5. If fi > 0 or {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ C, then B
fi
i (A) ∩ C = B
fi
i (A ∩ C) for every
event A ∈ Σ and every Σi-measurable event C ∈ Σ.
Proof: The proof of parts 1 and 3 is similar to the proof for Proposition 2
in Monderer and Samet (for p-belief operators). To prove part 4, observe that
Pi(C | ω) = 1 for every ω ∈ C, and Pi(C | ω) = 0 for every ω /∈ C. Part 2
follows from part 4, because for every A ∈ Σ, Bfii (A) is a Σi-measurable event
that contains {ω ∈ Ω | fi(ω) ≤ 0}. To prove part 5, assume {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ C.
In this case Bfii (C) = C \ {fi > 1}. Assume ω ∈ B
fi
i (A ∩ C). From part 1
we have ω ∈ Bfii (A) and ω ∈ B
fi
i (C) ⊆ C. For the other direction, assume
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ω ∈ Bfii (A) ∩ C. Then Pi(A | ω) ≥ fi(ω) and Pi(C | ω) = 1, and therefore
Pi(A ∩ C | ω) ≥ fi(ω); that is, ω ∈ B
fi
i (A ∩ C).
By Proposition 4.4, Bfii is a belief operator as defined by Monderer and
Samet (1989). Analogously to Proposition 3 in Monderer and Samet (1989)
we obtain the following characterization of common f -belief.
Proposition 4.5 The event C is a common f -belief at the state of the
world ω if and only if there exists an event D ∈ Σ such that (a) ω ∈ D, (b)
D ⊆ Bfii (C), and (c) D ⊆ B
fi
i (D) for every i ∈ {1, 2}.
4.1 Common f-Belief and Cooperation Events
In the spirit of the notion of iterated p-belief (see Morris, 1999), we define
the concept of iterated f -belief of pairs of events. As we will see below, this
notion is also related to the concept of common f -belief.
Definition 4.6 For every two events Ci ∈ Σ, i = 1, 2, define
D1,fi (Ci, Cj) := B
fi
i (Cj) ∩ Ci,
Dn,fi (Ci, Cj) := B
fi
i (D
n−1,f
j (Cj , Ci)) ∩D
n−1,f
i (Ci, Cj), for every n > 1,
Dfi (Ci, Cj) :=
⋂
n≥1
Dn,fi (Ci, Cj).
The event Dfi (C1, C2) is called the iterated f -belief of player i w.r.t. (C1, C2).
To understand this definition, suppose that ω is the true state of the
world, and C1 and C2 are two events that contain ω. Suppose that each
player i is informed of Ci. The statement ω ∈ D
f
i (Ci, Cj) is then equivalent
to the following: (a) player i fi-believes that ω is in player j’s set, (b) player
i fi-believes that (b1) ω is in player j’s set and that (b2) player j fj-believes
that ω is in player i’s set, etc. ad infinitum.
Because Bfi (A) is a Σi-measurable event for every event A, if Ci is a
Σi-measurable event, then the event D
f
i (C1, C2), the iterated f -belief of
player i w.r.t. (C1, C2), is also Σi-measurable, for every (not necessarily Σi-
measurable) event Cj.
As the next lemma states, Df1 (C1, C2) and D
f
2 (C2, C1) are the largest
subsets of C1 and C2, respectively, such that condition (b) in Theorem 3.2
holds.
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Lemma 4.7 1. For each i ∈ {1, 2} and every ω ∈ Dfi (Ci, Cj) one has
Pi(D
f
j (Cj, Ci) | ω) ≥ fi(ω). D
f
1 (C1, C2) and D
f
2 (C2, C1) are the largest
subsets of C1 and C2 (respectively) such that this property holds.
4
2. If Ci is Σi-measurable and {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ Ci for i = 1, 2, then D
n,f
i (Ci, Cj)
and Dfi (Ci, Cj) depend only on the intersection of Ci and Cj. In this
case, Df1 (C1, C2)∩D
f
2 (C2, C1) = D
f(C1 ∩C2), the event containing all
states of the world ω such that C1 ∩C2 is a common f -belief at ω, and
Dfi (Ci, Cj) = B
fi
i (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)), the event containing all states of the
world ω where player i f -believes that C1 ∩ C2 is a common f -belief.
Lemma 4.7(2) relates the concepts of common f -belief and iterated f -
belief: when fi(ω) > 0 for every ω 6∈ Ci and each i = 1, 2, the event
Df(C1 ∩C2)is the intersection of the iterated f -belief events D
f
1 (C1, C2) and
Df2 (C1, C2). Example 3 in Morris (1999) shows that the concept of iterated
belief that we defined here is different from the concept with the same name
defined in Morris (1999).
If f1 > 0 and f2 > 0, then the set {fi ≤ 0} is empty, and part 2 holds
as soon as Ci is Σi-measurable. The condition f1 > 0 and f2 > 0 holds in
particular for the case of p-beliefs, when f1 = f2 ≡ p for some p ∈ (0, 1].
Proof: To avoid cumbersome notation, we write Dfi and D
n,f
i instead of
Dfi (Ci, Cj) and D
n,f
i (Ci, Cj), respectively.
We first argue that Dfi ⊆ B
fi
i (D
f
j ). Indeed, by Proposition 4.4(3), and
since (Dn,fj )
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence of events,
Bfii (D
f
j ) = B
fi
i
(⋂
n≥1
Dn,fj
)
=
⋂
n≥1
Bfii (D
n,f
j ) ⊃
⋂
n≥1
(
Bfii (D
n,f
j ) ∩D
n,f
i
)
=
=
⋂
n≥1
Dn+1,fi = D
f
i .
For the maximality property, assume that K1 ⊆ C1 and K2 ⊆ C2 satisfy
Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki and each i = 1, 2. For each i ∈ {1, 2} we
then have Ki ⊆ B
fi
i (Kj), which implies that D
1,f
i (Ki, Kj) = Ki. It follows
by induction on n that Dn,fi (Ki, Kj) = Ki, and therefore D
f
i (Ki, Kj) =
4They are the largest in the following (strong) sense: if K1 ⊆ C1 and K2 ⊆ C2 satisfy
Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for each i = 1, 2 and every ω ∈ Ki, then Ki ⊆ D
f
i (Ci, Cj).
15
Ki. Because Ki ⊆ Ci it follows from Proposition 4.4(1) that D
f
i (Ki, Kj) ⊆
Dfi (Ci, Cj), and the first claim follows.
Denote C := C1 ∩ C2. Because {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ Ci, by Proposition 4.4(5) one
has D1,fi (Ci, Cj) = B
fi
i (C). This proves the first part of the second claim.
Because D1,fi (Ci, Cj) = B
fi
i (C), it can be verified from the definition that
for n ≥ 1 one has Dn,f(C) = Dn,f1 (C1, C2) ∩ D
n,f
2 (C2, C1), and therefore
Df(C) = Df1 (C1, C2) ∩ D
f
2 (C2, C1). The event “player i fi-believes that
C1 ∩ C2 is a common f -belief” is the event
Bfii (D
f(C)) = Bfii (D
f
1 (C1, C2) ∩D
f
2 (C2, C1)) (4)
= Bfii (Dj(Cj , Ci)) ∩D
f
i (Ci, Cj) = D
f
i (Ci, Cj). (5)
Since Dfi (C1, C2) is Σi-measurable, the second equality follows from Propo-
sition 4.4(5), and the last one from the first part of this lemma.
As a conclusion of Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 4.7 we obtain the following
result.
Theorem 4.8 If Ci ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2, then (B
f1
1 (D
f(C1∩C2)), B
f2
2 (D
f(C1∩
C2))) is a pair of cooperation events if and only if Pi(B
fj
j (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)) |
ω) ≤ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Λi \ B
fi
i (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)), for i = 1, 2. In particular,
(Bf11 (D
f(Λ)), Bf22 (D
f(Λ))) is a pair of cooperation events, where Λ = Λ1∩Λ2.
Proof: The first claim follows from Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 4.7, because
fi(ω) > 1 for every ω 6∈ Λi.
To prove the second claim, assume to the contrary that there exists ω∗ ∈
Λ1 \ B
f1
1 (D
f(Λ)) such that P1(B
f2
2 (D
f(Λ) | ω∗)) > f1(ω
∗). Denote K1 :=
Bf11 (D
f(Λ) ∪ {ω∗}) and K2 := B
f2
2 (D
f(Λ)). From the assumption, Pi(Kj |
ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki and each i ∈ {1, 2}, contradicting Lemma 4.7(1).
The last case defines the largest cooperation events: the profile in which
each player i plays the grim trigger course of action whenever he fi-believes
that it is a common f -belief that λ1, λ2 ≥
1
3
(and otherwise, always defects)
is an equilibrium.
Note that although there cannot be a pair of cooperation events larger
than (Bf1 (D
f(Λ)), Bf2 (D
f(Λ))), there may be smaller pairs of non-trivial co-
operation events (see Example 5.1 below).
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Remark 4.9 If we consider the solution concept of interim correlated ra-
tionalizability (ICR) instead of Bayesian equilibrium, we obtain slightly dif-
ferent results. First, the course of action D∗i is always rationalizable for
player i, regardless of the information structure, which makes condition (c)
in Theorem 3.2 redundant. Second, using similar arguments as in the proofs
of Theorems 3.2 and 4.8, it can be shown that GT ∗i is rationalizable for
player i if ω ∈ Bfii (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)) for some Ci ⊂ Λi. Therefore, the strategy
η∗i (B
fi
i (D
f(C1 ∩C2))) is rationalizable for every choice of Ci ⊂ Λi. This dif-
ference is more significant when considering larger games (see Section 6.1).
5 Examples
In this section we present several examples that illustrate properties of co-
operation events. Constructing examples where the only pair of cooperation
events is the trivial pair (∅, ∅) is not difficult. For example, if there is a player
i who, whenever his discount factor is higher than λ0i =
1
3
, assigns high prob-
ability to the event that player j’s discount factor is low, then that player will
never cooperate, and there will be no non-trivial pair of cooperation events.
The same phenomenon will occur if such a property holds in higher levels
of belief, e.g., there is a player i who believes that player j’s belief satisfies
that, whenever player j’s discount factor is higher than λ0j , player j assigns
high probability to the event that player i’s discount factor is low.
We start with two examples in which Bfii (D
f(Λ)) = Λi for i ∈ {1, 2},
so that (Λ1,Λ2) is a pair of cooperation events; in the first example, there
are additional pairs of non-trivial cooperation events, while in the second
example (Λ1,Λ2) is the unique pair of non-trivial cooperation events.
In all the examples in this section, Ω ⊆ [0, 1)2, and we interpret the coor-
dinates of ω ∈ Ω as the players’ discount factors, i.e. λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω)) =
ω. In all examples, each player’s belief regarding the other player’s discount
factor depends only on his own discount factor.
Example 5.1 Let Ω = {1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
}2. The belief of the players is derived from
a common prior, which is the uniform distribution over Ω.
We first show that Dfi (Λ1,Λ2) = Λi for each i ∈ {1, 2}, so that by Theo-
rem 4.8, ({1
2
, 3
4
}, {1
2
, 3
4
}) is a pair of cooperation events. We then argue that
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({3
4
}, {3
4
}) is also a pair of cooperation events.5 Note that
fi
(
3
4
)
=
1
6
, fi
(
1
2
)
=
1
2
, fi
(
1
4
)
=
3
2
.
Because λ01 = λ
0
2 =
1
3
, it follows that Λ1 = {
1
2
, 3
4
} × {1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
} and Λ2 =
{1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
}×{1
2
, 3
4
}. Therefore, P1(Λ2 | ω) =
2
3
for every ω. Since f1(
3
4
) < 2
3
and
f1(
1
2
) < 2
3
we get D1,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1. Similarly, D
1,f
2 (Λ2,Λ1) = Λ2. It follows
that Bf11 (D
f(Λ)) = Df1 (Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1, and therefore for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the
iterated f -belief of player i w.r.t. (Λ1,Λ2) is Λi.
To see that ({3
4
}, {3
4
}) is a pair of cooperation events, note that
P1
({
1
4
,
1
2
,
3
4
}
×
{
3
4
}
| ω
)
= P2
({
3
4
}
×
{
1
4
,
1
2
,
3
4
}
| ω
)
=
1
3
,
for every state of the world ω ∈ Ω and each player i ∈ {1, 2}, and use
Theorem 3.2. In fact, the same argument also implies that ({1
2
, 3
4
}, {1
2
, 3
4
}) is
a pair of cooperation events, because Pi({
1
2
, 3
4
} | ω) = 2
3
for every state of the
world ω ∈ Ω and each player i ∈ {1, 2}.
Example 5.2 Let Ω be as in the Example 5.1. The beliefs of the players are
given in Figure 2.
λj =
1
4
λj =
1
2
λj =
3
4
λi =
1
4
1
3
1
3
1
3
λi =
1
2
0 1
3
2
3
λi =
3
4
0 0 1
Figure 2: The beliefs of player i given his discount factor in Example 5.2.
Each player believes that the other player’s discount factor is at least as
high as his own. One can verify that Bfii (D
f(Λ)) = Λi for i ∈ {1, 2}, so that
({1
2
, 3
4
}, {1
2
, 3
4
}) is a pair of cooperation events.
Let Ci be as in Example 5.1. Because
P1
({
1
4
,
1
2
,
3
4
}
×
{
3
4
}
|
1
2
)
= P2
({
3
4
}
×
{
1
4
,
1
2
,
3
4
}
|
1
2
)
=
2
3
>
1
2
,
5To avoid cumbersome notation, in the examples we write { 3
4
} instead of { 3
4
}×{ 1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
}
or { 1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
} × { 3
4
}, and so on, when the meaning is clear. We also write f1(
3
4
) and f2(
3
4
)
instead of f1((
3
4
, y)) and f2((y,
3
4
)) for y ∈ Ω.
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it follows from Theorem 3.2 that ({3
4
}, {3
4
}) is not a pair of cooperation events.
One can verify that in this example, the only non-trivial pair of cooperation
events is ({1
2
, 3
4
}, {1
2
, 3
4
}).
In the following example Bfii (D
f(Λ)) is a strict non-empty subset of Λi
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Example 5.3 Let Ω be as in Example 5.1. The beliefs of the players are
given in Figure 3: each player believes that his discount factor is high if and
only if the other player’s discount factor is low.
λi
3
4
1
2
1
4
3
4
0 0 1
1
2
0 1 0
1
4
1 0 0
Figure 3: The beliefs of player i given his discount factor in Example 5.3.
One can verify that Bfii (D
f(Λ)) = {1
2
}, and that ({1
2
}, {1
2
}) is the unique
non-trivial pair of cooperation events.
The next example shows that even if there are no cooperation events,
there may be equilibria in which, with positive probability, the players even-
tually cooperate. Such a cooperation is achieved by having players signal
their information one to the other in the first stage of the game.
Example 5.4 Let Ω = {(1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
4
)}; that is, player 1 has a high discount
factor, while the discount factor of player 2 may be high or low. With prob-
ability p < 1
2
= f1(
1
2
) the state of the world is (1
2
, 1
2
).
We first argue that Bfii (D
f(Λ)) = ∅ for i ∈ {1, 2}, and hence there is no
non-trivial pair of cooperation events. Indeed, Λ1 = Ω and Λ2 = {(
1
2
, 1
2
)}, and
therefore Λ := Λ1 ∩ Λ2 = {(
1
2
, 1
2
)}. Now, D1,f1 = B
f
1 (Λ) = B
f
1 ({(
1
2
, 1
2
)}), and
since p < f1(
1
2
) < f1(
1
4
), we have D1,f1 (Λ) = ∅. Therefore, B
f
1 (D
f(Λ)) = ∅,
and thus Bf2 (D
f(Λ)) = ∅.
We claim that the following strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is a Bayesian
equilibrium.
19
Player 1: Play D in the first stage. From the second stage on play D∗1 if player
2 played D in the first stage, and play GT ∗1 if player 2 played C in the
first stage.
Player 2: If the state of the world is (1
2
, 1
4
), play the course of action D∗2. If the
state of the world is (1
2
, 1
2
), play C in the first stage; from the second
stage on play the course of action GT ∗2 , starting with action C at the
second stage, without taking into account player 1’s action at the first
stage.
Note that under this strategy profile, the first stage is used by player 2 to
signal the state of the world to player 1, and from the second stage on the
players either defect in all stages or cooperate in all stages.
We now verify that this strategy pair is a Bayesian equilibrium. Because
from the second stage on the players follow an equilibrium, any profitable
deviation involves deviating in the first stage.
Player 1 cannot profit by deviating in the first stage, because in the first
stage he plays a dominant strategy in the one-shot game, and his action at
that stage does not affect the evolution of the play.
We now argue that player 2 cannot profit by deviating in the first stage
either. Assume first that the state of the world is (1
2
, 1
2
). Player 2’s payoff
under σ is then 1
2
× 3
1− 1
2
= 3, while if he deviates in the first stage and plays
D his payoff would be 1
1− 1
2
= 2. Assume now that the state of the world is
(1
2
, 1
4
). Player 2’s payoff under σ is then 1
1− 1
2
= 2, while if he deviates in the
first stage and plays C he will be able to gain 4 in the second stage, so that
his payoff is bounded by 1
4
× 4 + (1
4
)2 × 1
1− 1
4
= 13
12
< 2.
Our last example concerns the continuity of cooperation events as the
players’ beliefs vary. It shows that even if each player knows approximately
the other player’s discount factor, there need not be cooperation events that
are close to (Λ1,Λ2). We will discuss this issue further in Section 6.2.
Example 5.5 Let Ω = (0, 1)2 be equipped with the Borel σ-algebra. Each
player believes that the other player’s discount factor is within ǫ > 0 of his
own: player i believes that λj is uniformly distributed in the interval (λi(ω)−
ǫ, λi(ω)+ ǫ)∩ (0, 1). One has Λ1 = [
1
3
, 1)× (0, 1) and Λ2 = (0, 1)× [
1
3
, 1). We
will show that Bf11 (D
f(Λ)) = [1
2
, 1) × (0, 1), provided ǫ is sufficiently small,
which will show that Λi and B
fi
i (D
f(Λ)) are not close in the Hausdorff metric.
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Let δ > 0. Because fi is a continuous monotonically decreasing function,
and because fi(
1
2
) = 1
2
, there exists δ′ > 0 such that fi(
1
2
− δ′) = 1
2
+ δ.
Therefore, any state of the world ω such that λi(ω) < min{
1
3
+ 2ǫδ, 1
2
−
δ′} is not in D1,fi (Λi,Λj). Indeed, for such states of the world ω, one has
Pi(Λj | ω) = Pi({λj ≥
1
3
} | ω) < 1
2
+ δ = fi(
1
2
− δ′) < fi(ω). Therefore,
D1,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) = [x
1, 1)× (0, 1) for some x1 ≥ min{1
3
+ 2ǫδ, 1
2
− δ′}; a similar
result holds for player 2. By the same reasoning, any state of the world ω such
that λi(ω) < min{x
1 +2ǫδ, 1
2
− δ′} is not in D2,fi (Λi,Λj), and D
2,f
1 (Λ1,Λ2) =
[x2, 1) × (0, 1) for x2 ≥ min{x1 + 2ǫδ, 1
2
− δ′}. We continue inductively,
and deduce that any state of the world ω such that λi(ω) <
1
2
− δ′ is not in
Dfi (Λi,Λj). This is true for every δ > 0. Because δ
′ goes to 0 as δ goes to 0,
Df1 (Λ1,Λ2) ⊆ [
1
2
, 1)× (0, 1). An analog inequality holds for player 2.
The inclusion Df1 (Λ1,Λ2) ⊇ [
1
2
, 1) × (0, 1) follows from Lemma 4.7(1),
because [1
2
, 1)× (0, 1) and (0, 1)× [1
2
, 1) satisfy inequality (b) of Theorem 3.2.
From Theorem 4.8 we deduce that ([1
2
, 1), [1
2
, 1)) is a pair of cooperation
events. An alternative way to show the last point is to use Theorem 3.2.
Note that this analysis does not change if Ω = (0, 1)2∩{(x, y) : |x−y| < ǫ},
which verifies that the true state of the world is within the support of the
beliefs of the players. Also, if, for every state of the world ω, player i believes
that λj is distributed in any non-atomic symmetric way around λi(ω), the
result still holds. Similar examples can also be constructed with a finite state
space.
6 Generalizations and Additional Results
6.1 General Two-Player Repeated Games
Our main results were given for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this
section we provide an analog result for general repeated games with incom-
plete information on the discount factors. We will start by explaining how
to adapt Theorem 3.2 to this setup. Conditions (b) and (c) of that theorem
will change, because in general games there are more ways in which a player
can deviate than in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. As we will see below, in the
general case, even if the event Df(Λ1 ∩Λ2) is not empty, there might not be
non-trivial cooperation events. This happens because in games larger than
2× 2, conditions (b) and (c) do not refer to the same function f , but rather
to different functions f and g, respectively, and therefore Df(Λ1 ∩ Λ2) does
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not automatically fulfill condition (c). However, in the spirit of Remark 4.9,
if we consider ICR as a solution concept, the function g becomes irrelevant
and η∗i (B
fi
i (D
f(C1∩C2))) are still rationalizable strategies for every choice of
Ci ⊂ Λi, and in particular for Ci = Λi. Therefore, unlike the case of Bayesian
equilibrium, when considering ICR the results remain essentially the same in
larger games.
Consider a two-player repeated game G where the set of actions of each
player i ∈ {1, 2} is a finite set Ai, and his utility function is ui : A1×A2 → R.
Each ui is extended multilinearily to mixed actions. As in the model of
Section 2, each player has incomplete information about the other player’s
discount factor. Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium in mixed actions of
the one-shot game Γ := ({1, 2}, A1, A2, u1, u2), and let τ = (τ1, τ2) be a pair
of pure actions that satisfies the following two conditions, for each i ∈ {1, 2}:
• ui(τ1, τ2) > ui(σ1, σ2), and
• τi is not a best response against σj .
The actions σ1 and σ2 are the analog of the action D in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, while the actions τ1 and τ2 are the analog of the action C.
Denote by σ∗i the course of action of player i in which he always plays σi.
Denote by GT ∗i the course of action of player i in which he plays τi in the
first stage, and in every subsequent stage he plays τi if player j played τj in
all previous stages, and plays σi otherwise.
The definition of a conditional grim trigger strategy is analogous to Def-
inition 2.1, with the course of action σ∗i replacing the “always defect” course
of action D∗i :
Definition 6.1 Let Ki ⊆ Ω be a Σi-measurable event. A conditional grim
trigger strategy for player i with cooperation region Ki, is the strategy η
∗
i (Ki)
defined as follows:
η∗(Ki | ω) =
{
GT ∗i (ω) ω ∈ Ki,
σ∗i (ω) ω 6∈ Ki.
(6)
Cooperation events are defined similarly to Definition 2.2. In the complete
information case, there are thresholds λ01, λ
0
2 such that the players can agree
to cooperate (and play according to τ) if and only if λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i for every
ω ∈ Ω, where
λ0i := min
{
λi |
ui(τ)
1− λi
−
(
ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1− λi
)
≥ 0 ∀σ′i 6= τi
}
.
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Denote Λi = {ω ∈ Ω | λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i }. Then in the complete information case,
Theorem 3.1 holds: (K1, K2) are cooperation events if and only if K1 = K2 ⊆
Λ, where Λ := Λ1 ∩ Λ2.
The analog of Theorem 3.2 in the general setup is the following.
Theorem 6.2 Let Ki ⊆ Ω be a Σi-measurable event for each i = 1, 2. The
pair (K1, K2) is a pair of cooperation events if and only if, for each i = 1, 2,
(a) Ki ⊆ Λi,
(b) Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki, and
(c) Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ gi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki,
for the Σi-measurable functions
6
fi(ω) := maxσ′i∈Fi
ui(σ
′
i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
, (7)
and
gi(ω) := min{g
1
i , g
2
i (ω), g
3
i (ω)},
where σ′i is an action of player i, and Fi = {σ
′
i ∈ Ai | ui(τi, σj) < ui(σ
′
i, σj)}.
The functions g1i , g
2
i (ω) and g
3
i (ω) reflect several types of deviations, and are
defined by
g1i := min
σ′i∈H
1
i
ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj)
(ui(σ)− ui(σ′i, σj)) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− ui(σi, τj))
where H1i := {σ
′
i ∈ Ai \ {σi, τi} | ui(σi, τj) < ui(σ
′
i, τj)},
g2i (ω) :=
ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)
(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) +
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
whenever ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
<
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
, and g2i (ω) := 1 otherwise,
and
g3i (ω) := minσ′i∈H3i (ω)
ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj)
(ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj))+(ui(τ)−ui(σi,τj)+(ui(σ′i,τj)−ui(σ))(λi(ω))
,
where
H3i (ω) := {σ
′
i ∈ Ai \ {τi} | ui(τ)− ui(σi, τj) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− ui(σ))λi(ω) < 0} .
6By convention, the infimum over an empty set is 1 and the supremum over an empty
set is 0.
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It is worth noting that the only difference between Theorem 3.2 and Theorem
6.2 is in condition (c): in the general case, player i (1− gi)-believes that the
event Kj does not hold at every ω 6∈ Ki, and not (1 − fi)-believes that this
event does not hold. The reason for this difference is that in general games
players have more options to deviate than in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and
therefore additional constraints affect the equilibrium conditions.
As in Section 4, the conditions in Theorem 6.2 are equivalent to the
following condition, which links the theorem to the concept of f -common-
belief: each player either f -believes that K1 ∩ K2 is a common-f -belief or
(1 − g)-believes that the event “K1 ∩ K2 is not a common-f -belief” is a
common-(1− g)-belief (see Maor (2010) for details).
The proof of Theorem 6.2 follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.2;
the interested reader is referred to Maor (2010) for the complete proof.
If Γ is not a 2× 2 game, there may be ω ∈ Ω such that fi(ω) > gi(ω). In
this case (Bf11 (D
f(Λ)), Bf22 (D
f (Λ))) may not be a pair of cooperation events.
This point is illustrated in Examples 6.3 and 6.4 below. In these two examples
we consider the following 3× 3 repeated game:
C
D
D C
N
N
0, ·
0, 4
1, 1
a, ·
3, 3
4, 0
·, ·
·, a
·, 0
where a > 4; payoffs that are not indicated in the matrix can be arbitrary.
Here σ = (D,D), τ = (C,C), and λ01 = λ
0
2 =
a−3
a−1
. In both examples,
fi(ω) = g
2
i (ω) =
1−λi(ω)
2λi(ω)
, g1i =
1
a−3
, and g3i (ω) =
1
(a−1)λi(ω)
.
In the following example Bfii (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2, but these sets do
not satisfy the conditions in Theorem 6.2. Moreover, we prove that in this
example there are no non-trivial pairs of cooperation events. For simplicity
the example uses an infinite state space. A similar construction is possible
with a finite state space.
Example 6.3 Let a = 6. The set of states of the world is Ω = (0, 1)2,
and the beliefs of the players are derived from a common prior, the uniform
distribution over Ω. One can verify that Λ1 = [3/5, 1) × (0, 1) and Λ2 =
(0, 1)×[3/5, 1). Because fi(ω) ≤ fi(3/5) =
1
3
< 1−3/5 = Pi(Λj | ω) for every
ω ∈ Λi, it follows that D
1
i (Λ1,Λ2) = Λi, and therefore B
fi
i (D
f(Λ1,Λ2)) =
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Dfi (Λ1,Λ2) = Λi. But, for ω /∈ Λi, Pi(λj ≥ 3/5 | ω) = 2/5 >
1
3
= g1i ≥
gi(ω), and therefore, in contrast to previous examples, the second condition
in Theorem 6.2 does not hold, and (Bf11 (D
f(Λ)), Bf22 (D
f(Λ)))) is not a pair
of cooperation events.
We now argue that the only pair of cooperation events is (∅, ∅). Suppose
to the contrary that there is a pair of non-empty cooperation events (K1, K2).
For i = 1, 2 denote λ∗i := inf{λi(ω) | ω ∈ Ki}. Since Ki ⊆ Λi, λ
∗
i ≥ 3/5.
Note that Pi(Kj | ω) is independent of the state of the world ω; denote
this quantity by Pi(Kj). From the first inequality of Theorem 6.2, we have
Pi(Kj) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki, and since fi is continuous, Pi(Kj) ≥ fi(λ
∗
i ).
We now argue that if λi(ω) > λ
∗
i , then ω ∈ Ki. Otherwise we deduce from
the second inequality of Theorem 6.2, that Pi(Kj) ≤ gi(ω) ≤ g
2
i (ω) = fi(ω).
Since λi(ω) > λ
∗
i it follows that fi(ω) < fi(λ
∗
i ) ≤ Pi(Kj), a contradiction.
Therefore, we have that Pi(Kj) = 1− λ
∗
j .
Next, we argue that Pi(Kj) = fi(λ
∗
i ). Otherwise Pi(Kj) > fi(λ
∗
i ), and
there is a state of the world ω ∈ Ω such that Pi(Kj) > fi(ω) > fi(λ
∗
i ). From
the definition of λ∗i we have ω /∈ Ki, but then we should have Pi(Kj) ≤
g2i (ω) = fi(ω), a contradiction. We conclude that 1 − λ
∗
j = fi(λ
∗
i ) for i =
1, 2. Because fi(λi) =
1−λi
2λi
, we have that
1−λ∗2
2λ∗2
= 1 − λ∗1 = 2λ
∗
1(1 − λ
∗
2), or
equivalently, λ∗1λ
∗
2 =
1
4
. But λ∗i ≥ 3/5 for i = 1, 2, a contradiction.
In the following example Bfii (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅ and does not satisfy the condi-
tions in Theorem 6.2, but for a smaller non-empty set, the conditions hold,
and therefore define a Bayesian equilibrium.
Example 6.4 Let a = 5, and Ω = {1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
}2. The beliefs of the players
are derived from a common prior, which is the uniform distribution over
Ω. Here λ0i =
1
2
, and therefore Λi = {λi(·) ≥
1
2
}. As in the Example 6.3,
Bfii (D
f(Λ)) = Dfi (Λi,Λj) = Λi, but the second condition of Proposition 6.2
does not hold because of g1i : P1(Λ2 | (
1
4
, λ2)) = 2/3 >
1
2
= g1i .
For Ci = {λi =
3
4
} we get Dfi (Ci, Cj) = Ci, and one can verify that the
second condition of Proposition 6.2 does hold. Therefore,
η∗i (ω) =
{
τ ∗i λi =
3
4
,
σi λi =
1
4
, 1
2
,
defines a Bayesian equilibrium.
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6.2 “Almost” Complete Information
Monderer and Samet (1989) use the notion of common p-belief to measure
approximate common knowledge. A natural question is then, whether when
there is common (1 − ε)-belief regarding the discount factor for sufficiently
small ε > 0, there is a pair of cooperation events that is close to (Λ,Λ), the
largest pair of cooperation events in the complete information case.
In this section we provide two natural definitions for the notion “almost
complete information”; in one the answer to the question we posed is nega-
tive, in the other it is positive. We present the results without proofs; the
interested reader is referred to Maor (2010) for additional examples and for
the complete proofs, which are basically applications of Theorems 3.2 and
6.2 and results from Monderer and Samet (1989). The discussion in this
section is related to Monderer and Samet (1996), who show that the concept
of common repeated p-belief is related to the continuity of the Nash equilib-
rium correspondence relative to the information structure (see also Einy et
al. (2008)).
Example 5.5 shows that when each player approximately knows the other
player’s discount factor, the cooperation events may be significantly different
from Λ; this is true even if we consider only δ-equilibrium for some δ > 0.
Other concepts of perturbation of the complete information case are also
possible, and they may yield different results. For example, the structure
theorem in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) shows that there are arbitrary small
perturbations of the product topology of beliefs that make no conditional
grim trigger strategy rationalizable.
Following Monderer and Samet (1989), we can suggest the following def-
inition of almost complete information.
Definition 6.5 Assume a common prior P over the set of states of the
world. Let ǫ, δ > 0. We say that the discount factors are almost complete
information with respect to ǫ and δ, if the set of states of the world in which
the true discount factors are common-(1 − ǫ)-belief has probability at least
1− δ.
In other words, this definition means that in most states of the world, the
true state of nature in a common p-belief for a high p, that is, the true state
of nature is known with a high probability, that fact is known with high
probability, etc.
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From Theorem B in Monderer and Samet (1989) we deduce that if the
number of states of nature is finite, there are a strategy profile η and an event
Ω′ with probability at least (1− 2ǫ)(1− δ), such that (a) η(ω) = η∗(Λ,Λ)(ω)
for every ω ∈ Ω′, and (b) η is an ǫ′-equilibrium for ǫ′ > 4Mǫ, where M is the
maximal absolute value of the payoff that a player can obtain in any state of
the world:
M := sup
ω∈Ω
max
a∈A1×A2
max
i=1,2
ui(a)
1− λi(ω)
<∞.
In other words, there is an ǫ′-equilibrium that coincides over a large set
with the conditional grim trigger equilibrium of maximum cooperation in
the complete information case.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma and other 2×2 games, this profile η can indeed
be a conditional grim trigger profile, as the following proposition states. In
the proposition’s statement, f εi is the function defined in (7) after subtracting
ε from the numerator.
Proposition 6.6 Suppose each player has two actions. Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0
be given, and denoteM0 := 2maxi=1,2(ui(σ)−ui(τi, σj)). Assume that the dis-
count factors are almost complete information with respect to ǫ and δ. Then,
for every ǫ′ ≥M0ǫ, the strategy profile η
∗(B
fǫ
′
1
1 (D
fǫ
′
(Λ)), B
fǫ
′
2
2 (D
fǫ
′
(Λ))) is an
ǫ′-equilibrium, and P (Λ \Df
ǫ′
(Λ)) < δ.
For games where a player has more than two actions, the profile η may
not be a conditional grim trigger strategy profile. Moreover, there may be
no conditional grim trigger ǫ′-equilibria whatsoever, even in the case of a
finite state space (see Example 8.3 in Maor (2010)). This happens because
this definition of almost complete information allows the existence of “prob-
lematic” states that occur with small probability, in which the beliefs of the
players can be far from complete information, while conditions (b) and (c)
in Theorem 6.2 pose demands on all states of the world.
Therefore, with conditional grim trigger strategies in games that are larger
than 2×2, to obtain an ǫ′-equilibrium that coincides over a large set with the
conditional grim trigger equilibrium of maximum cooperation in the complete
information case, we need a stronger concept of almost complete information,
which is “almost complete” in all states of the world, and not merely over a
large set of states of the world.
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Definition 6.7 Let ǫ > 0. We say that the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ, if at every state of the world ω, each
player (1 − ǫ)-believes that some state of nature is common-(1− ǫ)-belief in
ω.
When the information is almost complete according to this definition, we
can point at an ǫ′-equilibrium in conditional grim trigger strategies:
Proposition 6.8 Let ǫ > 0. Assume that the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ (according to Definition 6.7). Then the
strategy profile η∗(B1−ǫ1 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)), B1−ǫ2 (D
1−ǫ(Λ))) is an ǫ′-equilibrium, for
every ǫ′ > Mǫ, where M > 0 is a constant, independent of the information
structure and of ǫ.
While there can be almost complete information on the discount factors
(according to Definition 6.7) even if there is no common prior, if there is a
common prior, then this concept is stronger than the concept in Definition
6.5. In this case, under a common prior, the ǫ′-equilibrium in conditional grim
trigger strategies described above indeed coincides over a large set with the
conditional grim trigger equilibrium of maximum cooperation in the complete
information case, as stated by the following proposition. In other words,
under a stronger concept of almost complete information, we have a result
that is quite similar to the one in Theorem B of Monderer and Samet (1989),
but with a conditional grim trigger profile that is defined explicitly for every
state of the world.
Proposition 6.9 Let ǫ > 0. Assume that (a) the beliefs of the players
are derived from a common prior P ; (b) the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ (according to Definition 6.7); and (c)
the number of states of nature is finite or countable. Then (i) the strategy
profile η∗(B1−ǫ1 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)), B1−ǫ2 (D
1−ǫ(Λ))) is an ǫ′-equilibrium, for every ǫ′ >
M1ǫ, where M1 > 0 is a constant, independent of the players’ beliefs and of
ǫ; (ii) under this strategy profile, both players will cooperate if and only if
ω ∈ D1−ǫ(Λ); and (iii) P (Λ \D1−ǫ(Λ)) < 3ǫ.
6.3 Further Generalizations
Theorem 3.2 can also be generalized for other cases, with the necessary ad-
justments to the functions fi and gi and the sets Λi. One generalization is for
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the case of incomplete information regarding one’s own discount factor. A
second generalization concerns games with more than two players. In these
cases, using similar ideas one can obtain analog results regarding sufficient
conditions for equilibria in conditional grim trigger strategies. Because the
information structure and the game structure are more complicated in multi-
player games, further assumptions should be made. E.g., in the case of more
than two players, to treat all the other players within the framework of one
function f one needs to take some “worst case scenario”. This makes the
conditions only sufficient and not necessary. See Maor (2010) for details.
Lastly, the theorem can be extended to general games with incomplete
information. Let G = (N, (S,S),Π, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) be a general two-player
Bayesian game. To avoid measurability problems, assume that the set of
states of the world is finite or countable. Assume that there is a course of
action profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) that is an equilibrium for all states of nature when
information is complete, and that there is another course of action profile,
τ ∗ = (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) that is an equilibrium only in some states of nature when the
information is complete. Suppose that the supports of τ ∗i and σ
∗
i are disjoint
in all states of the world; that is, it is discernable whether player i plays σ∗i
or τ ∗i . A strategy of player i is an i-measurable function that assigns a course
of action of player i to each state of the world.
Let Λi ⊆ Ω be the event “player i believes that he cannot benefit by
deviating from the profile τ ∗”. That is, for every ω ∈ Λi and every course of
action σ′i of player i, Ei(ui(τ
∗) | ω) ≥ Ei(ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) | ω).
Theorem 6.10 In the game G there exist i-measurable functions 0 ≤ fi, gi ≤
1, i = 1, 2, such that if K1 ⊆ Λ1 andK2 ⊆ Λ2, the strategy profile η
∗(K1, K2) =
(η∗1(K1), η
∗
2(K2)) is a Bayesian equilibrium if and only if for i = 1, 2,
1. Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki, and
2. Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ gi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki.
or, in other words, if and only if
1. Ki ⊂ B
fi
i (Kj), and
2. Kci ⊂ B
1−gi
i (K
c
j ).
There are several differences between Theorem 6.10 and Theorem 6.2.
First, here we assume that K1 ⊆ Λ1 and K2 ⊆ Λ2 whereas in Theorem 6.2
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we showed that it was necessary for η∗(K1, K2) to be a Bayesian equilibrium.
This weakened result allows us to drop the assumption that τ ∗i is not a best
response to σ∗j , and only requires that it is discernable whether player i plays
σ∗i or τ
∗
i (disjoint supports).
7 Second, we do not assume that the realized
payoffs are observed, so that all a player knows is his expected payoff based
on his information on the states of nature. Third, we do not assume that the
payoffs when τ ∗ is played are higher than when σ∗ is played.
For further generalizations and complete the reader is referred to Maor
(2010).
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.2
Because a strategy of player i is a Σi-measurable function, a necessary con-
dition for η∗i (Ki) to be a strategy is that Ki is Σi-measurable.
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ki be a Σi-measurable event. We will check when
a deviation from η∗(K1, K2) can be profitable.
Assume first that ω ∈ Ki. In this case player i is supposed to follow the
grim trigger course of action GT ∗.
If ω 6∈ Kj , player j will play D all along the game, regardless of the play
of player i. If ω ∈ Kj , player j will follow the grim trigger course of action
GT ∗. It then follows that if player i deviates and plays D at stage k, then he
receives the highest payoff if he continues to play D after stage k. Because
payoffs are discounted, if a deviation to D at stage k is profitable to player
i, then a deviation at stage 1 provides a higher profit. Therefore, the best
possible deviation of player i is to the course of action D∗. This deviation is
not profitable if and only if
γi(η
∗(Ki, Kj) | ω) ≥ γi(D
∗
i , η
∗
j (Ki, Kj) | ω), (8)
where D∗i is player i’s strategy in which he always plays D. One can verify
that
γi(η
∗(Ki, Kj) | ω) = Pi(Kj | ω)
(
3
1− λi(ω)
)
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
.
(9)
7Still, as before, if we assume that τ∗i is not a best response to σ
∗
j and if the payoffs in
G are bounded, then fi > 0.
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Indeed, according to player i’s belief, with probability Pi(Kj | ω) player j
plays GT ∗, so they will play (C,C) at every stage and his payoff will be
3
1−λi(ω)
, and with probability (1 − Pi(Kj | ω)) player j plays D
∗, so in the
first stage he will get 0, and afterwards the players will play (D,D); therefore
in this case player i’s payoff is λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
. Similarly,
γi(D
∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) = Pi(Kj | ω)
(
4 + λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
1
1−λi(ω)
)
.
(10)
Plugging in (9) and (10) in (8) yields that D∗i is not a profitable deviation
for player i if and only if Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω), which is condition (b). Since
fi(ω) > 1 for ω /∈ Λi, this also implies that Ki ⊆ Λi, which is condition (a).
Now assume that ω /∈ Ki. In this case under η
∗
i (K1, K2) player i follows
the course of action D∗. If player i follows η∗i (K1, K2) at the first stage, then
from the second stage on player j will play D, and then the best reply of
player i is to play D.
If ω 6∈ Kj , player j follows D
∗, and η∗i (K1, K2) is player i’s best re-
sponse. If ω ∈ Kj , player j follows GT
∗, and therefore if there is a prof-
itable deviation to player i, he must deviate at the first stage. Thus, to
check whether η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium we need to check whether
γi(η
∗(K1, K2)) ≥ γi(GT
∗
i , η
∗
j (K1, K2)), where GT
∗
i is the grim trigger course
of action of player i.
One can verify that
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) = (1−Pi(Kj | ω))
1
1− λi(ω)
+Pi(Kj | ω)
(
4 +
λi
1− λi
| ω
)
and
γi(C
∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) = Pi(Kj | ω)
3
1− λi(ω)
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
.
The inequality γi(η
∗(K1, K2)) ≥ γi(GT
∗
i , η
∗
j (K1, K2)) then reduces to Pi(Kj |
ω) ≤ fi(ω), and condition (c) is obtained.
Finally we need to verify that fi is Σi-measurable. This function is a
rational function of λi, and therefore it is a Borel function of λi. Since Σi
contains the sets {ω | λi(ω) ∈ B}, for every open set B ⊆ [0, 1), fi, as a
function of ω, is indeed Σi-measurable.
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